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Abstract
This paper develops a general theory of land inheritance rules. We distinguish
between two classes of rules: those that allow a testator discretion in disposing of
his land (like a best-qualified rule), and those that constrain his choice (like primogeniture). The primary benefit of the latter is to prevent rent seeking by heirs, but
the cost is that testators cannot make use of information about the relative abilities
of his heirs to manage the land. We also account for the impact of scale economies
in land use. We conclude by offering some empirical tests of the model using a
cross-cultural sample of societies.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: K11, P51

Land Inheritance Rules: Theory and Cross-Cultural Analysis

1. Introduction
Inheritance of land is of interest to economists because of its importance in
determining the ownership and distribution of wealth in society (Pryor, 1973). Yet there
is tremendous diversity in the rules and norms that govern the inheritance of real property
across different societies and cultures. In some cultures, inheritance is governed by rules
that endow the testator with little or no discretion regarding the distribution of his
property; examples include primogeniture (inheritance by the eldest son), ultimogeniture
(inheritance by the youngest son), and equal distribution among potential heirs. In other
cultures, the testator is afforded considerably more discretion, as when the land is passed
to the heir judged to be the best qualified to use it. Our objectives in this paper are, first,
to develop a general theory of land inheritance that focuses on the incentives land
inheritance rules create for potential heirs, and second, to see how well the theory can
explain the wide diversity of rules governing inheritance of land across societies.1
Of the rules mentioned above, primogeniture is the most widely discussed among
both economists and anthropologists, probably because it is relied upon by such a large
and diverse collection of societies and cultural groups. A common explanation among
economists is that primogeniture prevents land from being fragmented into inefficiently
small parcels.2 But if increasing returns to scale in land was the impetus for
primogeniture, then why not allow testators to allocate the undivided land to the heir best
1

Although we focus on land, much of the analysis is applicable to other forms of property.
For example, Friedman (1985): p. 66) notes that the New England colonies “had little use for
primogeniture,” while it survived in the South until 1800, “partly because of their system of land use,”
which tended to involve large estates. In this respect, land tenure in the South more resembled that in
2
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qualified to use it? Such a scheme preserves optimal scale while at the same time
expanding the choices of the testator. More generally, why do inheritance customs often
restrict the choices of testators with rigid social rules like primogeniture?
The literature on inheritance rules has centered on incentives they create for heirs
(and others) to invest in use and maintenance of land. Miller (1980) documents the
extensive writing of classical economists on the subject, noting that both Smith and Mill
argued that the system of primogeniture in England was flawed because it prevented
those who could most ably use land from getting it. Other economists, most notably
Malthus and McCulloch, argued that primogeniture in fact created beneficial incentives
for potential land users.3 More recent discussions have tended to follow the classical
literature by emphasizing the incentive effects created by a given rule weighed against
the costs of limiting the set of potential land users.4
In this paper, we take a somewhat different approach by showing that the primary
benefit of a fixed inheritance rule is that it prevents wasteful competition (or rentseeking) among the potential heirs, a problem first discussed in this context by Buchanan
(1983). The trade-off is that potential gains are surrendered if a younger heir turns out to
be relatively more talented in using the land. The model emphasizes this trade-off
between rules and discretion, along with the degree of scale economies in land use, to
explain the choice among various land inheritance rules.

England than in New England. Also see Posner (1998: pp. 553-554). In contrast, Chu (1991) develops a
model that he traces to Adam Smith in which primogeniture serves to preserve family lines.
3
Though, as Miller points out, Malthus arguments in support of primogeniture rested primarily on the idea
that primogeniture created incentives for others to strive to emulate those at the top of the social ladder.
4
See, for example, Becker (1981) and Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985). Smetters (1999) provides
a good recent review of this literature.
2

In addition, we examine how a well-functioning land market affects the choice of
inheritance rules, an issue that seems to have been ignored in the literature.5 We show
that a land market renders the inheritance rule largely irrelevant, given that heirs can buy
and sell land regardless of how much they receive from the testator. Moreover, since
heirs anticipate this, they make efficient prior investments, thereby avoiding wasteful rent
seeking. The fact that markets eliminate the benefits of primogeniture suggests that it
should not be widely observed in modern (developed) societies, while technologically
undeveloped societies (where markets are absent) may not have achieved sufficient
economies of scale for its benefits to be realized. The theory therefore implies that the
allocative benefit of primogeniture is greatest in societies that have attained an
“intermediate” level of economic development.
In testing the theory, we adopt a different approach than previous lines of
empirical research on land inheritance, which has typically focused on analyzing the
impact of inheritance rules on bequests, or has explored the development and evolution of
inheritance rules over time for a specific region. Previous research has also
overwhelmingly focused on inheritance rules in Western Society. By contrast, our
empirical work is in the tradition of Pryor (1977), and focuses on the incidence of
different types of inheritance rules across cultures from all corners of the globe. One
advantage of this approach is that it allows the possibility of measuring the relationship
between the development of the land market and inheritance rules.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model and
describes the testator’s objective function. Section 3 considers the case of increasing
5

Though Polanyi (1957, chapter 15) provides some discussion of the ways in which the needs of a modern
market economy may undermine traditional institutions governing the distribution of land such as
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returns to scale in land use, which implies that a single heir should receive all of the land.
Given this result, we compare an unrestricted inheritance rule (best-qualified) to a fixed
rule (primogeniture) and show when each is preferred. Section 4 undertakes a similar
analysis for the case of decreasing returns to scale. Here, the comparison is between
optimal and equal sharing of the land. Section 5 examines the impact of a wellfunctioning land market for optimal inheritance rules. Section 6 explores some empirical
implications of the theory using a cross-cultural sample of inheritance rules. Finally,
Section 7 concludes.
2. General Model
The value of land to heir j is given by the separable production function6

x j v (λ)

(1)

where xj is heir j’s investment in land-specific human capital, and λ is the parcel size.
The function v is increasing in λ (i.e., vλ > 0 ) and v(0)=0. The sign of v λλ will depend on
the nature of the scale economies associated with the land input: if vλλ > 0 , there are
economies of scale, whereas if vλλ < 0 there are diseconomies of scale. Generally, one
expects scale economies for small lots but eventually scale diseconomies as lot sizes
increase.7 The relevant range here depends on the size of the testator’s land holding,
which we denote L. Below, we consider both the case of scale economies ( vλλ( L) > 0 )
and diseconomies ( vλλ( L) < 0 ).

primogeniture.
6
We adopt the separable form for (1) purely for analytical simplicity. None of the qualitative conclusions
below rely on it.
7
This is in fact what Colwell and Munneke (1999) found for urban land markets.
4

For simplicity, we assume throughout that there are two heirs. We also assume
(for now) that there does not exist a well-functioning land market. Thus, heirs can only
acquire land by bequest. This part of the analysis is therefore most relevant for primitive
agricultural societies or developing countries in which land is the primary productive
resource, and formal institutions like markets are not well developed. (This appears to be
an implicit assumption made in much of the literature on inheritance.) Below, we relax
this assumption and examine the impact of a land market on optimal inheritance rules.
The model consists of two periods. In the first period the heirs make some
investment in land-specific human capital. They make this investment fully cognizant of
the rules governing inheritance (or lack thereof) in their society. Then, between the first
and second periods, the value of a random variable θ is realized that reflects the relative
abilities of the heirs to manage the land. This ability parameter is distinct from the heirs’
investment in x, although they can be substitutes for each other. We assume that the
support of θ is the closed unit interval with expected value of ½.
In the second period, the testator chooses the shares of his parcel to be given to
each heir. Given these shares and the realization of θ, we write the returns to heirs one
and two, respectively, as θx1v( sL) and (1 − θ ) x 2 v((1 − s ) L) , where L is the size of the
parcel to be bequeathed, and s is the share of the land given to heir one. We abstract
from the impact of differences in age and suppose that the two heirs are indistinguishable
at period one.8
The testator’s choice of s in period two is made subject to the social rule (if any)
governing the distribution of land through inheritance. If there is no rule, the testator can
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choose s in any way he sees fit and cannot credibly commit to a fixed rule beforehand.
Since there are no constraints on his choice, we assume that he chooses the shares to
maximize the productive potential of his family given all available information (i.e., the
xj’s and θ). In contrast, if primogeniture or some other fixed rule is established, the
testator is completely constrained in his decision-making. In this case, both heirs know
that there is no chance this rule will be changed or violated at the inheritance date.
Once the value of θ is revealed in period two, the land is awarded to the heirs
according to the sharing rule, s, subject to the institutional environment. Aggregate
welfare from the land upon its transfer is given by the sum of the heirs’ returns, or
W = θx1v( sL) + (1 − θ ) x 2 v((1 − s ) L) − c( x1 ) − c( x 2 )

(2)

where c( x j ) denotes the opportunity costs of investing in human capital incurred by each
heir, c′>0, c″>0. (This may be thought of as the cost of not preparing for some
alternative career.) Generally, we explore two regimes describing the testator’s choice of
s. Under restricted regimes (primogeniture, equal sharing), s is fixed by social norm
before the heirs choose x1 and x2, whereas under unrestricted regimes (best-qualified,
optimal sharing), the testator chooses s at the inheritance date to maximize (2) after
observing the realization of θ.9 Recall that, absent a norm, there is no way for the testator
to credibly commit to a fixed rule beforehand.
We examine both types of rules with the objective of determining when each type
is desirable. We begin with the case of scale economies.
8

The heirs could be endowed with a natural difference due, for example, to age, but this complicates the
model without adding any additional insights. Thus, we will not distinguish between primogeniture and
ultimogeniture.

6

3. Scale Economies

In this section, we consider the case where there are scale economies in land use
over the relevant range. That is, vλλ > 0 for lots of size L or smaller. Note that this is the
implicit assumption in standard explanations for primogeniture. We first derive the
optimal inheritance rule when the testator faces no restrictions.
3.1.The Best-Qualified Rule
Under this regime, the testator effectively chooses s on his deathbed to maximize
(2) given all available information. We therefore write the optimal value of s selected by
the testator as s*(x1,x2,θ). The first derivative of (2) with respect to s is given by
∂W
= L[θx1v λ ( sL) − (1 − θ ) x 2 v λ ((1 − s ) L)] ,
∂s

(3)

and the second derivative is given by
∂ 2W
= L2 [θx1v λλ( sL) + (1 − θ ) x 2 v λλ((1 − s ) L)] .
2
∂s

(4)

The assumption of scale economies implies that the latter expression is positive, or that W
is convex in s. Thus, the maximum occurs at one of the end-points, s=0 or s=1. That is,
one of the heirs should receive all of the land. The optimal choice of the testator in an
unrestricted regime with scale economies is therefore a “best-qualified” rule.
To see how the best qualified heir is determined, note that s=1 is optimal if and
only if W evaluated at one exceeds W evaluated at zero, or if and only if

θx1v ( L) > (1 − θ ) x2 v ( L) .

(5)

9

One might object that maximization of (2) will in some cases disinherit one of the heirs. We could
address this problem by adding a constraint that assures a minimum level of income for all heirs. However,
this would complicate the model without, we believe, altering our basic results.
7

After canceling v(L) and rearranging, this condition becomes10

θ>

x2
.
x1 + x 2

(6)

Note that if the two heirs choose the same investment in x (as they will since we have
assumed they are identical in all respects as of period one), heir one will get the land if

θ>1/2, and heir two will get it if θ<1/2. Thus, if θ is symmetrically distributed, then each
heir has an equal chance of inheriting the land.
As of period one when the heirs choose their x’s, however, the outcome of
condition (6) is probabilistic. If we assume that the heirs act non-cooperatively, then heir
one believes he can increase the likelihood that (6) holds (and hence, that he will get all
of the land) by raising x1, taking x2 as given; while heir two believes he can decrease the
likelihood that (6) holds by raising x2, taking x1 as given. As noted above, this creates a
classic problem of rent seeking along the lines of that studied by Mortensen (1982). We
can therefore prove the following:
Proposition 1: Under a best-qualfied rule, both heirs overinvest in land-specific human
capital in the Nash equilibrium.11

In the symmetric Nash equilibrium, xˆ1 = xˆ 2 = xˆ (given identical cost of effort functions).
As a result, xˆ 2 /( xˆ1 + xˆ 2 ) = 1 / 2 , or each heir has an equal probability of being chosen best
qualified. If we assume that θ is distributed uniformly on [0,1], then the expected value
of the welfare function under the best-qualified rule is
Wˆ =

1

1/ 2

1/ 2

0

∫ θdF (θ ) xˆv( L) + ∫ (1 − θ )dF (θ ) xˆv( L) − 2c( xˆ )

10

Here is where the separability of the production function in (1) matters. In particular, the linearity of the
value function in x causes the land component to drop out of this condition, making it depend solely on x
and θ.
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= (3 / 4) xˆv( L) − 2c( xˆ ) .

(7)

Note that the coefficient of ¾ on the first term is greater than E(θ)=1/2. This reflects the
fact that the land is awarded to the heir with the higher realized value of θ under the bestqualified rule.12 Thus, while the rule induces excessive investment by heirs, it offers this
offsetting benefit.
3.2 Primogeniture
Primogeniture is a “customary” inheritance rule and hence not subject to change
by the testator. Operationally, the rule will no longer be conditional on the realization of

θ or the x’s. Although we focus on primogeniture, our model does not distinguish the
heirs by age. Thus, the model applies to any rule that pre-specifies a single heir as the
sole inheritor. The reason why primogeniture (or any fixed rule) might be desirable in
our model is that it eliminates rent seeking; the drawback is that it may end up awarding
the land to the less able heir.
To examine this trade-off, suppose it is pre-determined that heir one will inherit
the land. Heir two will clearly choose x2=0 in this case, while heir one will solve
max E (θ ) x1v( L) − c( x1 ) .

(8)

x1 be the solution to this problem. We then have the following result:
Let ~

Proposition 2: Under a fixed inheritance rule the designated heir overinvests in x relative
to the social optimum.
Heir one overinvests relative to the optimum because he is certain to receive the land
under the predetermined rule, whereas under the optimal conditional rule, he would only
receive the land if he turned out to be best qualified. (In this sense, heir two underinvests
11
12

Proofs of all propositions are contained in the Appendix.
In particular, note that for a uniform distribution on [0,1], ¾=E[θ|θ>1/2].
9

because he has no chance to receive the land under primogeniture, even if he is bestqualified.) Compared to the best-qualified rule, heir one may invest more or less under
primogeniture. He will tend to invest more because he is certain to get the land, but he
will tend to invest less because there is no rent-seeking effect.
Expected welfare under primogeniture is given by
~
W = E (θ ) ~
x1v( L) − c( ~
x1 )
= (1 / 2) ~
x1v( L) − c( ~
x1 ) .

(9)

In order to compare primogeniture with the best-qualified rule, we use (7) and (9) to form
the difference
~
W − Wˆ = [(1 / 2) ~
x1v( L) − c( ~
x1 )] − [(3 / 4) xˆv( L) − 2c( xˆ )] .
Re-arranging, we obtain
~
W − Wˆ = [(1 / 2) ~
x1v( L) − c( ~
x1 )] − [(1 / 2) xˆv( L) − c( xˆ )] + c( xˆ ) − (1 / 4) xˆv( L) .

(10)

Note first that the difference between the first two bracketed terms must be positive
because, by definition, ~
x1 maximizes the expression in brackets. This, along with the
positive term, c(xˆ ) , reflect the savings in wasteful rent-seeking expenditures by both
heirs under a rule that pre-determines who will get the land. This is the social benefit of
primogeniture. The cost, reflected by the last term in (10), is the loss from not being able
to award the land to the best-qualified heir. In general, either of these effects might
dominate. A fixed rule will therefore be preferred when rent seeking is expected to be
severe, while the best-qualified rule will be preferred when ability is expected to be an
important factor for efficient land use.

10

4. Scale Diseconomies

We now turn to the case where there are decreasing returns to scale in the land
input for lots of size L, or vλλ( L) < 0 . In this case, some division of the land between the
heirs will be optimal. As above, we consider both restricted and unrestricted inheritance
regimes.
4.1 Optimal Sharing
We first consider an optimal sharing rule under which the testator determines the
shares of each heir after observing θ, x1 and x2. The optimal shares, call them s* and 1-s*,
are determined by setting the derivative in (3) equal to zero to obtain

θx1vλ ( sL) = (1 − θ ) x 2 vλ ((1 − s) L) .

(11)

Given diseconomies of scale, the second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied (i.e.,
(4) is negative). Comparative statics reveal that s* (heir one’s share) is increasing in θ
and x1, and decreasing in x2. As a result, rent seeking again occurs as heirs compete for a
larger share of the land. Thus, we have the following:
Proposition 3: Under an optimal sharing rule, both heirs overinvest in human capital in
the Nash equilibrium.
In a symmetric equilibrium, the investment levels are xˆ1 = xˆ 2 = xˆ , yielding expected
welfare of
1

1

0

0

Wˆ = ∫ θxˆv( s * L)dF (θ ) + ∫ (1 − θ ) xˆv((1 − s*) L)dF (θ ) − 2c( xˆ ) ,

where s* satisfies (11) for each realization of θ.
4.2 Equal Sharing

11

(12)

The analog to primogeniture in a world of scale diseconomies is a fixed societal
rule such as equal sharing (s=1/2). In this case, the testator is relieved of discretion, and
the heirs realize that the commitment to the rule is credible. Given E(θ)=E(1-θ)=1/2,
each heir chooses xj to
max(1 / 2) x j v( L / 2) − c( x j ) , j=1,2.

(13)

x1 = ~
x2 = ~
x denote the optimal investment levels. Note that in this case, there is no
Let ~

rent seeking because the shares are independent of the heirs’ choices of x.
Expected social welfare under the equal sharing rule is given by
1

1

0

0

~
W = ∫ θ~
x v( L / 2)dF (θ ) + ∫ (1 − θ ) ~
x v( L / 2)dF (θ ) − 2c( ~
x).

(14)

As above, we compare expected welfare under optimal and equal sharing by using (12)
and (14) to form the difference
1

~
W − Wˆ = ∫ [θ~
x v( L / 2) + (1 − θ ) ~
x v ( L / 2) − 2c ( ~
x )]dF (θ )
0

1

− ∫ [θxˆv( s * L) + (1 − θ ) xˆv((1 − s*) L) − 2c( xˆ )]dF (θ ) .

(15)

0

Generally, this expression is ambiguous in sign. On the one hand, it will tend to be
positive because ~
x by definition maximizes the first line whereas x̂ does not maximize
the second line due to rent seeking. On the other hand, s* maximizes the second line for
any given value of θ and x̂ . Thus, the trade-off is identical to that above: while an
optimal sharing rule conditions the shares on the realized abilities of the heirs, it also
induces them to engage in wasteful rent seeking. As a result, the preferred rule will
depend on which of these effects dominates.

12

5. Impact of a Land Market

In this section we study the impact of a well-functioning land market on land
inheritance rules. Specifically, we assume that land can be bought and sold in any
quantity at a fixed price p. (To avoid the problem of wealth constraints, we could focus
instead on a land rental market or assume a well-functioning credit market.)
Note that existence of a land market adds a possible third period to the above
model. Recall that in the first period, heirs make their investments in land-specific
human capital (x), and in the second period, the testator allocates his land (if the rule
permits) by choosing s. In the third period heirs can now buy and sell land. Our
principal result in this setting is the following:
Proposition 4: The existence of a perfect land market renders the inheritance rule
irrelevant.
Intuitively, if heirs can buy and sell (or rent) land freely, then the final allocation of land
will be efficient and independent of the testator’s allocation decision. This result, of
course, is simply a consequence of the Coase Theorem (Coase, 1960). Further, given the
irrelevance of the inheritance rule, we can prove:
Proposition 5: Heirs will choose the efficient level of land-specific investment.
This follows because heirs do not have to compete for their father’s land, so rent seeking
effects are absent.
The preceding results account for the relative freedom of inheritance in modern
societies. They also suggest that inheritance remains an important institution for land
transfer in developing countries where the lack of formal property rights inhibits the
transfer and collateralization of land.13
13

See, for example, Besley (1995), Alston, et al. (1996), and de Soto (2000).
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6. Empirical Analysis

In this section, we employ two complementary data sets to explore the
relationships between our theory and patterns in land inheritance in a cross section of
societies. Our approach differs from previous literature on land inheritance and
primogeniture. One branch of that literature focuses on the impact of inheritance rules on
bequests, as in Stiglitz (1969), Pryor (1973), and Menchik (1980); while another consists
of detailed historical analysis of inheritance in one region or locale, as in Gagan’s (1976)
analysis of land inheritance in Ontario, Kennedy’s (1991) analysis of farm inheritance in
Ireland, or the papers in Goody, Thirsk, and Thompson (1976). Much has also been
written about the historical evolution of land inheritance in Western Europe and England
(Habakkuk, 1994). In contrast, our research studies the incidence of inheritance rules
using a representative sample of world cultures. We employ the methodology pioneered
by Pryor (1977), and used more recently by Anderson and Swimmer (1997) in their
analysis of land ownership, and Stodder (1995) in his analysis of institutions governing
exchange. In a similar fashion, we use our theory as a tool to explore broad trends in
inheritance rules across a sample of societies that vary widely in technological and
institutional sophistication.
Generally, we find that there is positive correlation between the occurrence of
fixed inheritance rules and the level of technological, social, and political development.
However, we also find evidence that more technologically advanced societies are more
likely to have land markets, which in turn lessens the chances that a fixed inheritance rule
will be employed. Among those societies in which inheritance rules are present, we find
evidence supporting the conjecture that scale economies lead societies to rely upon sole
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heir inheritance rules (such as primogeniture), as opposed to dividing land among heirs.
Finally, we find limited support that the incidence of fixed sole heir rules is correlated
with social prestige and with transactions costs.
6.1. Description of the Data and Empirical Specification
Our data derives primarily from the Standard Cross Cultural Sample (SCCS),
started in Murdock and White (1969).14 The SCCS contains information on the material
culture, technology, and institutions of 186 different societies from all corners of the
world. Almost every cultural group in the world is represented in the sample. The SCCS
includes a rich variety of societies covering a wide range of development levels,
including hunter-gatherers (such as the Mbuti Pygmies), and complex nation-state
cultures (such as the Romans).
Our primary dependent variable, the presence of a fixed rule governing
inheritance, derives from the information provided by the SCCS on “The rule or practice
governing the disposition or transmission of a man’s property in land.” For each society,
Murdock reports the nature of the land inheritance rule based on whether inheritance is
best described by 1) equal or relatively equal distribution between heirs, 2)
primogeniture, 3) exclusive inheritance by the best-qualified heir, 4) ultimogeniture, or 5)
absence of a fixed rule or “no knowledge” of the rule. Our empirical work will focus on
comparison of those societies employing fixed rules with those that do not. We also study
the frequency of primogeniture among those societies that employ fixed inheritance rules.
14

The SCCS originally appeared in a series of papers in Ethnology in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s,
which collectively describe the data in detail. For these sources, see Murdock and Provost (1973). The data
in the SCCS is based on Murdock’s (1967) Ethnographic Atlas, which contains a much larger sample of
societies, but is less complete. This data, and related data sets, are generally available in digital form. See
White (1992) for the Ethnographic Atlas and Stark (1987) for a description of the SCCS. The SCCS can
also be acquired on the world wide web; see http://eclectic.ss.uci.edu/~drwhite/worldcul/index.html. To our
knowledge, Pryor’s (1977) does not exist in digital form.
15

For purposes of the analysis, we classify societies using equal or relatively equal
distribution, primogeniture, and ultimogeniture as having fixed inheritance rules; and
those using a best-qualified rule or no reported rule as having no fixed rules.
This methodology has two drawbacks. First, those societies for which information
is missing may actually have rules, or may not practice land ownership at all. Second, the
category “equal or relatively equal” may in fact allow some degree of discretion in land
allocation among heirs. These difficulties, however, stack the deck against finding
meaningful statistical relationships when none actually exist, and thus decrease the
chances that we might reach false conclusions in interpreting results.
Since the presence of scale economies in land use, and the degree to which heirs
must learn land-specific tasks, are important factors in our theory, we must first capture
quantitatively the likelihood that some sort of scale economies are present, and more
generally, the importance of technology and skill in using land. Almost any technological
development increases the likelihood of scale economies, including better land
cultivation techniques, the quality of tools available to workers, the degree to which
workers are specialized, or the means by which goods are transported. Less obvious
things may also contribute to scale economies in land use, such as a society’s capacity to
store information and keep records, or a society’s capacity to enforce and maintain rules.
Demographics, such as the density and spatial distribution of population, and
characteristics of social organization, such as the degree to which political institutions are
present and developed, may also lead to scale economies in land use.
While these ideas are difficult to capture quantitatively in any setting, the SCCS
provides several useful “scale” variables, which are designed to measure the complexity
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of each society across ten different dimensions. The SCCS’s ten scale variables measure
the development of writing and record-keeping systems, fixity of residence, nature and
importance of agricultural technology, degree of urbanization, extent of craft
specialization, nature of land transport, the nature and presence of currency, population
density, and the degree to which the society has a politically integrated hierarchy. Also
reported by the SCCS is “the degree of social stratification,” which measures the extent
to which a society is stratified into social classes. We shall have occasion to treat this
variable separately from the other scales, as it may pertain directly to theories of land
inheritance based on social standing. For example, Chu argues that primogeniture may
result from a lineage’s welfare maximizing response to a social system linking status and
wealth. Thus, we might expect social stratification to be positively correlated with
primogeniture, apart from any impact it may have on social development or technology.
All the scale variables run from a minimum of one to a maximum of five, and the
exact meaning of each is described in detail in Table 1. Murdock and Provost contains a
thorough description of the details and difficulties encountered in the construction of
these measures. A final useful device, also engineered by Murdock and Provost, is an
aggregated version of the scale variables, which Murdock refers to as a “composite index
of cultural complexity.” This aggregate index is the sum of all the scale variables.15 We
shall also employ this composite index at places in our analysis as a convenient catch-all
measure for the level of development and technology in a society.
The presence or absence of a land market is a central element of our theory, which
we argue should reduce the likelihood that a society relies on a fixed inheritance rule of
any sort. That said, information on whether or not a society possesses a well-functioning
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land market is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to obtain for the majority of
societies in the SCCS. Pryor’s (1977) The Origins of the Economy, however, contains
information on the presence and importance of land markets for a smaller sample of
societies, a large fraction of which also appear in the SCCS. For each of the 60 societies
in his dataset, Pryor reports varying degrees of land market presence and importance,
noting whether 1) land sales do not occur, 2) land sales do occur but do not seem
important, 3) land sales occur and do seem important, 4) land is only bought and sold
with nonmembers of the society. Pryor further notes whether 1) land rental does not
occur, 2) land rental occurs but is unimportant, 3) land rental occurs and is important, and
4) land rental occurs only with nonmembers of society. We formulate a dummy that
awards each society a one if land sales or land rental occurs within that society and “is
important,” and zero otherwise. Land markets are unlikely to be well functioning if they
are unimportant (recall our theory relies upon the land market being competitive), and if
land purchase or rental transactions are conducted only with outsiders (perhaps because
the land market is the result of colonialism or even extortion). Of the 60 societies that
appear in Pryor’s data set, 42 societies also appear in the SCCS, and according to our
definition, 7 of the 42 had a well-functioning land market. We make use of these data to
develop a predictive model of the probability that a society has a well-functioning land
market using the 42 societies for which information is available. We then employ the
result to generate a probabilistic prediction that any society has a well-functioning land
market. Before performing this operation, it is useful to have a closer look at the data and
note some of the points of interest and difficulties involved in performing this task.
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We thank an anonymous referee for recommending the use of this variable.
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Table 2 presents bivariate correlations between each of the scale variables, and
the Spearman correlation coefficient between the scale variables. The last row of Table 2
shows the Spearman correlation coefficient between each scale variable and the land
market dummy for the 42 societies appearing both in Pryor’s data set and in the SCCS.
The last column of Table 2 shows the correlations between each of the scale variables
and the composite index. It is immediately apparent that the scale variables are almost
without exception positively and significantly correlated with one another, and with the
existence of a land market. This is not surprising as technological development in one
dimension may precipitate development in another, or the development and adoption of
different types of technology may be complementary. To the extent that almost any
innovation allows specialization, which generates possibilities for exchange, it is also not
surprising that each scale variable, and in particular the technological specialization scale
variable, is strongly correlated with the existence of a market. On some level any of the
scale variables could be the cause, or the result, of market development. For example,
population density, fixity of residence, and urbanization could all increase as a result of
the development of a land market, but by the same token, each may also precipitate
development of a market if only by making land a more scarce commodity.
From Table 2, the composite complexity index is strongly and somewhat
uniformly correlated with each scale variable and also with the presence of a land market.
A simple inference one might derive from this rough comparison is that technological,
political, and social development are generally complementary, in that societies do not
systematically develop along one technological dimension at the expense of others. Given

19

these points, it is difficult to choose one scale variable as “the” indicator that best predicts
the existence of a land market.
Since we wish to develop a proxy of the likelihood of land markets across our
entire dataset, it is necessary to find a suitable instrument for the emergence of a land
market. We have elected to rely on the composite complexity index as our sole predictor
of the likelihood a well-functioning land market exists. We thus fit the following the logit
model:
Ln[Plmkt/(1-Plmkt)]= -11.097 + .284 Comp. Complexity Index
(3.699) (.100)
N=42, Psuedo-R2=.63516
where Plmkt =1 if the society has a land market, and 0 otherwise. This model was then
applied to the each of the 186 societies to generate a predicted probability that each
society has a well-functioning land market.
We rely on this simple model for two primary reasons. First, for such a small
number of available observations, maintaining degrees of freedom is an obvious concern.
Use of the total development index allows us to preserve degrees of freedom while
simultaneously allowing a wide variety of different technological factors to influence the
presence or absence of a land market.17 Second, the resulting predictions generated by
the logit model are not linear combinations of any of scale variables. Thus, when we
estimate models for the presence or absence of fixed inheritance rules, there is no need to
exclude scale variables to identify the model. Indeed, we have no reason a priori to favor
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The Pseudo-R2 that we present here and in other parts of the paper is the one developed by Nagelkerke
(1991), and is defined as R=(1-L0/Lb)2/n/(1-L0)2/n, where L0 denotes the value of the likelihood function for
the restricted model, and Lb denotes the likelihood function for the unrestricted model. It is a correction of
the more widely known Cox and Snell Pseudo-R2.
17
In fact, Pryor (1977) uses almost exactly the same model in his study of the emergence of land markets.
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one technological scale variable over another in its capacity to predict scale economies,
and allowing each to enter into our econometric models allows us to see along which
dimensions technology and complexity vary with land inheritance rules. While we run
the risk of introducing multicollinearity among independent variables, this does not bias
coefficient estimates but merely reduces the possibility that we will find relationships
when they do not exist.
6.2. Results
Tables 3 and 4 present means of the data broken down, respectively, according to
region and inheritance rules. Table 3 breaks the data down according to six main
geographical regions into which both Murdock and Pryor divided their samples. It is
evident that Circum-Mediterranean societies are, by just about any standard, the most
complex and technologically advanced in the SCCS, and also have a significantly higher
predicted probability of land market existence. Eurasian societies also appear to be
systematically more complex than the others in the sample, while the African and Insular
Pacific societies lie towards the middle of the development spectrum. South American
and North American societies appear to be systematically less technologically and
socially complex than others. Table 3 also reveals that fixed inheritance rules appear to
occur with greater frequency among societies in regions that are on average more
complex such as the Circum-Mediterranean, and occur much less frequently among the
systematically less complex cultures of North America and South America. The inference
one might draw from this simple look at the data is that land markets, technological and
social sophistication, and inheritance rules are all positively correlated.
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Table 4 breaks down scale variables and the predicted probability of a land
market by nature of inheritance rule. From this data, one arrives at the same conclusions
reached from the regional breakdown of the data: technology and complexity, a land
market, and the presence of land inheritance rules all appear to be positively correlated.
However, no clear distinctions emerge between those societies that have rules and those
that do not.
The first two columns of Table 5, labeled I and Ia, present logistic models which
take the presence (dependent variable =1) or absence of a fixed land inheritance rule as
the dependent variable, where each of the scale variables and the predicted probability of
a land market enter as independent variables. These models reveal sharply different
features of the data than our preliminary comparisons of means and correlation
coefficients. Both models I and Ia suggest that, controlling for technology and
complexity, the predicted probability of a land market has a significantly negative impact
on the likelihood that a fixed inheritance rule is observed. Thus, our hypothesis that land
inheritance rules are negatively impacted by the existence of markets appears to be
confirmed, after controlling for the impact of technology. Moreover, the estimated
models broadly bear out our contention that more developed technology favors fixed
inheritance rules. Of the technological and social scale variables, the one with the most
significant economic impact is the scale measuring technological specialization.
Other significant variables include the development of writing and records, the
sophistication of land transport, and the fixity of residence. Of these variables, the one
with the least obvious interpretation, in that it doesn’t appear to bear directly on the
complexity of land-use technology, is the sophistication of writing and records. However,
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a more developed writing system may lead to more well-defined land rights, and also
allow easier transfer of land, each of which might magnify the importance of learning to
use land and/or the incentives to invest time in learning to use land.
There are two exceptions to this trend: both the agricultural scale variable and the
urbanization scale variable have significant and negative signs. An explanation for this
might be as follows. If agriculture is the most important source of livelihood for the
largest variety of people in the sample, it may well be the case that opportunities are not
available for other heirs. 18 Also, in a more urbanized society, land and land ownership
may be less important than other types of property, reducing the need for fixed
inheritance rules.
The social stratification variable turned out to be insignificant. This is not
surprising as we might expect this variable to explain the incidence of primogeniture
rather than the existence of a rule in general. We discuss this variable further in the
context of models that explain the use of sole heir rules among those societies that
employ some rule.
The next two models, II and IIa, fit two simple logit models that examine the
incidence of primogeniture among only those societies that have fixed inheritance rules.
These two models did not perform as well as our previous two, but do yield some
interesting insight into the nature of primogeniture. In model IIa, we removed the social
stratification variable and replaced it with a dummy variable called “dual stratification,”
which, according to Murdock, is the state of affairs when a society is stratified “…into a
18

Interestingly, Murdock notes that descent patterns follow a similar pattern. Bilateral descent
predominates at low and high levels of development, but is replaced by more specialized rules at middle
levels of development. While Murdock makes note of this phenomenon, he does not attempt to explain it,
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hereditary aristocracy and a lower class of ordinary commoners or freemen, where
traditionally ascribed noble status is at least as decisive as control over scarce resources”
(Murdock, 1967: 58). We included a dummy if dual stratification existed and zero
otherwise, as we felt it was most relevant to arguments like Chu’s: namely, that
primogeniture is a natural way that status can be upgraded or maintained. The
significantly positive coefficient on the variable suggests that this is indeed the case.
Model IIa attempts to increase the performance of the model by excluding
insignificant independent variables to reduce multicollinearity and by including the new
dual stratification dummy variable. The technological specialization index and the
complexity of the writing and record keeping are now significant at the 1% and 5%
levels, respectively. The strong positive sign of technological specialization is in line with
the predictions of the model, but it may also pick up an effect that measures the
possibilities available to heirs who do not receive the land. One interpretation of this is
that the opportunity costs of learning how to use land are relatively high, and thus should
be avoided by having a fixed-sole-heir rule.
The negative sign of the writing and records coefficient could indicate a
transaction cost reason for using primogeniture. If the writing/record keeping system is
poor, keeping exact records of land divisions may be prohibitively costly. Thus, a fixed
sole heir rule such as primogeniture may ease the transactions costs associated with
defining and maintaining land rights.
To get an idea of the importance of some of the salient features in the model
explaining the incidence of fixed sole heir rules, we fit two simple models that rely

writing that “This essentially bimodal of curvilinear distribution is inconsistent with any unilinear
interpretation of social development.” (Murdock, 1973: 392)
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wholly on the composite complexity index. The first model restates the model we used to
predict the probability of a land market, while the second replaces all technological
variables in Model I above with the composite complexity index.
Ln[Plmkt/(1-Plmkt)]? = -11.097 + .284 Comp. Complexity Index
(3.699) (.100)
N=42, Psuedo-R2=.635
Ln[Pfr/(1-Pfr)]

=-2.469 + .127 Comp. Complexity Index – 2.313 Land Market Prob.
(.754) (.033)
(1.178)
N=186, Psuedo-R2=.164

In the second equation, Pfr equals 1 if a society has a fixed rule and zero
otherwise. These two equations describe, respectively, the predicted impact of
technological and social development on the likelihood of a land market, and both the
direct and indirect impact (through the increase in likelihood of a well-functioning land
market) of technological and social development on the incidence of fixed inheritance
rules. Since both dependent variables ultimately depend on one argument, predicted
probabilities can be easily plotted on a diagram, which is done in Figure 1. The figure
plots the predicted values of the probability of a land market, the predicted probability of
a fixed inheritance rule setting the land market probability to zero, and the predicted
probability of a fixed inheritance rule when the predicted probability of a land market is
allowed to vary accordingly.
In interpreting the graph, note first that the chances of a land market existing
appear to increase rapidly after a complexity threshold is reached. Further, the reduction
in the likelihood of observing a fixed rule appears to lie in approximately the 10% range
at the upper part of the complexity spectrum. While this is far from verifying that a rule is
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rendered irrelevant by the existence of a land market, it does admit the general idea that
markets may replace institutions regulating behavior. Perhaps this notion would be borne
out to a greater degree in a sample that included better information on the existence and
operation of a land market, or a sample that also included information for more modern
societies.
Interestingly, these ideas provide a potential explanation for a puzzle mentioned
by Murdock and Provost (1973: 391-392) within the context of discussion of descent
rules and their relationship to cultural and technological complexity. They noted that
bilateral, flexible descent rules proliferate among societies at the tail ends of the
complexity distribution, while more specialized and rigid descent systems appear among
societies at the middle of he complexity distribution. Murdock and Provost leave the
phenomenon unexplained, writing “This essentially bimodal or curvilinear distribution is
inconsistent with any unilinear interpretation of social development.” (Murdock and
Provost, 1973: 392). Our results suggest that societies at the low end of the technological
spectrum have no need for fixed social rules, since issues of suboptimal investment in
learning, and the general importance of skill and technological sophistication, have not
yet asserted themselves in economic life. In contrast, societies at the high end of the
spectrum are more likely to have well functioning markets, which render rules moot.
7. Conclusion

In this paper we have developed a model in which heirs make human capital
investments in learning to use their father’s land prior to inheritance. In this framework,
the primary benefit for passing all land to a single heir is returns to scale. Adopting a rule
that designates a fixed sole heir has the further benefit of forestalling excessive
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competition between heirs in investing to use the land, but the drawback is that it does
not allow potentially beneficial adjustment of the inheritance bundle. Thus, in an
imperfect world, neither a fixed-sole-heir rule nor a best-qualified rule achieves the first
best outcome. We find, however, that in a world in which land markets function well, the
inheritance rule is irrelevant. The testator is indifferent between potential allocations
among his heirs when armed with the knowledge that they may buy and sell land.
Broad empirical regularities support aspects of our theory. For example, we find
that cultures employing fixed sole heir rules, such as primogeniture or ultimogeniture,
tend to exhibit scale economies in land, but at the same time have not sufficiently
developed agricultural technology allowing for a land market. Thus, they are in some
sense “intermediate” in their level of development. We also find limited evidence that
fixed sole heir rules are more likely when a greater variety of alternative occupations are
open to potential heirs. Finally, preservation of social status, whether or not there is a
land market, appears to be a major impetus for adoption of fixed-sole-heir rules.
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Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1: Let F(θ) be the distribution function for θ. Thus, (6) implies that

1− F(

x
x2
) is the probability that s=1, and F( 2 ) is the probability that s=0. The
x1 + x2
x1 + x2

problem for heir one is therefore to
max[1 − F (

x2
x2
)]E (θ | θ >
) x1v( L) − c( x1 ) .
x1 + x 2
x1 + x 2

(A1)

Given that
E (θ | θ >

x2
)≡
x1 + x 2

1

∫

θdF (θ ) /[1 − F (

x2 /( x1 + x2 )

x2
)] ,
x1 + x 2

(A1) becomes
1

max

∫ θdF (θ ) x v( L) − c( x ) .
1

(A2)

1

x2 /( x1 + x2 )

Equating marginal benefits and marginal costs implies
1

∫

x2 /( x1 + x2 )



x2
 x1 + x 2

θdF (θ )v( L) + 

  x2
 f 
  x1 + x 2




x2
 x1v( L) 
= c ′( x1 ) ,
2 

 ( x1 + x 2 ) 

(A3)

which defines heir one’s reaction function. This, along with the corresponding reaction
function for heir two, determines the equilibrium investment levels ( xˆ1 , xˆ 2 ) . Note that
the second term on the left-hand side of (A3) reflects the increase in the probability of
inheritance resulting from an increase in x1. It therefore captures the rent-seeking effect.
The socially optimal investment levels, defined to be the levels that the testator
would “instruct” the heirs to choose (if he could), maximize the joint expected value in
(2). Equating the marginal social benefit and marginal social cost for heir one yields
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1

∫ θdF (θ )v( L) = c′( x ) ,

(A4)

1

x2 /( x1 + x2 )

which, along with the corresponding condition for heir two, determines the optimum (x1*,
x2*). Note that, compared to (A3), this condition has no rent-seeking term. It follows that
in a symmetric equilibrium, xˆ j > x *j , j=1,2.19
Proof of Proposition 2: The condition defining ~
x1 is
1

∫ θdF (θ )v( L) = c′( x ) .

(A5)

1

0

x1 > x1* .
Comparing (A5) to (A4) immediately shows that ~
Proof of Proposition 3: Note first that the comparative statics from (11) are
∂s * x1vλ ( sL) + x 2 vλ ((1 − s ) L)
=
>0
∂θ
− SOC

(A6)

∂s * θvλ ( sL)
=
>0
∂x1
− SOC

(A7)

∂s * (1 − θ )v λ ((1 − s ) L)
=
<0 ,
∂x 2
SOC

(A8)

where SOC is the second-order condition, which is negative. Now consider the choice of
x1 by heir one given s*. (A similar analysis applies to heir two.) His problem is to
1

max ∫ θx1v( s * ( x1 , x 2 ,θ ) L)dF (θ ) − c( x1 ) .

(A9)

0

The condition defining his reaction function is
1

1

 ∂s * 
dF (θ ) = c ′( x1 ) .
∂
x
 1

∫ θv(s * L)dF (θ ) + ∫ θx1vλ (s * L)
0

19

0

This is true regardless of whether the reaction functions are positively or negatively sloped.
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(A10)

The second term on the left-hand side is the rent-seeking term and is positive by (A7).
This term drops out when x1 is chosen to maximize the expected joint return of the heirs.
Thus, as under the best-qualified rule, the heirs over-invest in x.
Proof of Proposition 4: Consider first the land transactions following the allocation of
land to the heirs. The return to heir one after buying an amount of land λ1 is given by

θx1v( sL + λ1 ) − c( x1 ) − pλ1 .

(A11)

Note that if heir one received some land from the testator (i.e., if s>0), then he can also
sell land, in which case λ1 would be negative in this expression. Heir two’s return after
buying (selling) λ 2 units of land is similarly given by
(1 − θ ) x 2 v((1 − s ) L + λ2 ) − c( x 2 ) − pλ 2 .

(A12)

If both heirs transact optimally, then λ*1 and λ*2 , respectively, satisfy the following firstorder conditions20

θx1vλ ( sL + λ1 ) − p = 0

(A13)

(1 − θ ) x2 vλ ((1 − s ) L + λ2 ) − p = 0 .

(A14)

Together, these conditions imply that the marginal valuations of land by the heirs are
equal, or

θx1vλ ( sL + λ1 ) = (1 − θ ) x2 vλ ((1 − s ) L + λ2 ) .

(A15)

Now move back to stage two when the testator chooses s, assuming that he is
unrestricted in his choice. He therefore chooses s to maximize
W = θx1v( sL + λ*1 ) + (1 − θ ) x 2 v((1 − s ) L + λ*2 ) − c( x1 ) − c( x 2 ) − pλ*1 − pλ*2 . (A16)
The first derivative is
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∂W
= L[θx1vλ ( sL + λ*1 ) − (1 − θ ) x2 vλ ((1 − s ) L + λ*2 )]
∂s
 ∂λ* 
 ∂λ* 
+ [θx1vλ ( sL + λ*1 ) − p ] 1  + [(1 − θ ) x2 vλ ((1 − s ) L + λ*2 ) − p ] 2  .
 ∂s 
 ∂s 

(A17)

Note that both expressions on the second line drop out by (A13) and (A14), while the
first line drops out by (A15). Thus, (A17) equals zero for all values of s. This proves the
irrelevance of s.
Proof of Proposition 5: Proposition 5 proves that the testator’s choice of s can be
ignored. Thus, heir one’s problem is to maximize his expected return, given by
1

∫ [θx v(sL + λ ) − c( x ) − pλ ]dF (θ ) ,
*
1

1

1

*
1

(A18)

0

where λ*1 is a function of both θ and x1 according to (A13). (Heir two’s problem is
symmetric.) The first-order condition for x1 implies
 ∂λ*1 
′
∫0 [θv(sL + λ ) − c ( x1 ) + (θx1vλ − p) ∂x1 ]dF (θ ) = 0 .
1

*
1

(A19)

Since λ*1 is chosen optimally for all realizations of θ, the term θx1 v λ -p=0 by (A13).
Thus, (A19) reduces to
E (θ )v( sL + λ*1 ) − c ′( x1 ) = 0 .

(A20)

There are no rent-seeking effects here given the “irrelevance” of s. Further, heir one’s
choices of x1 and λ1 are socially optimal since there are no externalities.

20

Note that the second-order conditions for an optimum imply that v λλ < 0 at the λ j ’s. Thus, the heirs
*

will always end up in the range of decreasing returns to scale.
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Table 1: Description of scale variables contained in analysis, descriptions contained in Murdock
(1973) and SCCS
Scale
Variable
Writing and
Records

=1 if:

=2 if:

=3 if:

=4 if:

=5 if:

No writing or
records

Mnemonic devices

Non-written
records

True writing; no
records

True writing;
records

Fixity of
Residence

Nomadic

Seminomadic

Semisedentary

Sedentary;
impermanent

Sedentary

Agriculture

None

10% food supply

10%; secondary

Primary, not
intensive

Primary,
intensive

Urbanization

Fewer than 100
persons

100-199 persons

200-399 persons

400-999 persons

1000 persons

Technological
Specialization

No pottery,
looms, or
metalworking

Pottery only

Loom weaving
but not
metalworking

Metalworking,
weavers, or
potters

Smiths,
weavers,
potters

Land
transport

Human only

Pack animals

Draft animals

Animal-drawn
vehicles

Automotive
vehicles

None

Domestically
Usable Currencies

Alien Currency

Elementary
Forms

True Money

Population
Density

less than 1
person per
square mile

1-5 persons per
square mile

5.1-25 persons
per square mile

26-100 persons
per square mile

>100 persons
per square
mile

Political
Integration

None

Autonomous Local
Communities

1 level above
community

2 levels above
community

3 levels
above
community

Egalitarian

Hereditary slavery

2 social classes,
no castes or
slavery

2 social classes,
castes and
slavery

>2 social
classes,
castes, with
or without
slavery

Money

Social
Stratification
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Table 2: Correlations between Murdock’s scale measures of development

Writing and
Records

Writin Fix. of Agric. Urban. Tech. Land Money Pop. Pol. Int. Soc.
g and Res.
Spec. Trans.
Dens.
Strat.
Recs.
.247* .343* .422* .490* .627* .530* .362* .578*
.621*

Fixity of
Residence

.247*

Agriculture

.343* .782*

.782* .450* .406*

.076

.412*

.707*

.411*

.437*

.701*

.509* .548*

.233*

.356*

.638*

.509*

.433*

.752*

.435*

.397*

.375*

.560*

.476*

.489*

.705*

.469*

.417*

.468*

.564*

.579*

.739*

.409*

.211*

.423*

.475*

.574*

.557*

.531*

.470*

.700*

.565*

.500*

.783*

.710*

.786*

Deg. Of Urban. .422* .450* .509*
Tech.
Specialization

.490* .406* .548* .435*

Land Transport .627*

.076

Comp.
Comp.
Index
.711*

.233* .397* .469*

Money

.530* .412* .356* .375* .417*

.409*

Pop. Density

.362* .707* .638* .560* .468*

.211*

Political
Integration

.578* .411* .509* .476* .564*

.423*

.531*

.565*

Social
Stratification

.621* .437* .433* .489* .579*

.475*

.470*

.500*

.710*

Land Market?
.488* .270** .554* .473* .531* .329** .482* .336** .397*
=
(N=42)
* Denotes significance at the 1% level.
** Denotes signifcance at the 5% level.
=
Spearman correlation coefficients, significance levels are results of Chi-square tests.
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.784*
.450*

.628*

Table 3: Means of technological scale variables and nature of land inheritance by region
SCCS

SubSaharan
Africa
28
1.32*

CircumMediterranean
28
4.04*

Eurasia
34
3.00**

Insular
Pacific

North
America

South
America

31
1.87**

33
2.18

32
1.72*

N
Writing and
Records

186
2.35
(1.47)

Fixity of Residence

3.76
(1.56)
3.45
(1.51)

4.07

4.00

3.71

4.55**

2.94*

3.44

3.75

4.18*

3.62

3.74

2.30*

3.28

Urbanization

2.59
(1.40)

2.61

3.32*

2.65

2.45

2.45

2.13

Technological
Specialization

3.09
(1.41)

3.75*

4.32*

3.68*

2.13*

2.06*

2.81

Land Transport

1.79
(1.18)

1.14*

2.64*

2.50*

1.29*

1.79

1.34*

Money

2.51
(1.48)

2.46

3.39*

2.67

2.97

2.15

1.45*

Population
Density

2.86
(1.56)

3.25

3.57*

3.18

3.55*

1.88*

1.91*

Political
Integration

2.96
(1.18)

3.07

3.89*

2.73

3.35

2.38*

2.39*

Social
Stratification

2.45
(1.46)

2.50

3.79*

2.94

2.23

1.82*

1.59*

Composite
Complexity
Index

27.81
(10.3)

27.92

37.14*

31.59**

27.29

22.00*

22.03*

Pred. Prob. of
Land Market

.1842

.1053**

.4820*

.3155**

.1017

.0052*

.0069*

%Fixed Rule=

.64

.75

.86*

.77

.61

.55

.34*

%Fixed sole
heir=

.28

.62*

.21

.23

.22

.22

.00**

Agriculture

Land
Inheritance:

*

Significant difference from rest-of-sample mean at the 1% level
Significant difference from rest-of-sample mean at the 5% level
=
Spearman correlation coefficients, significance results are from Chi-square tests.

**
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Table 4a: Means by nature of land inheritance
N

Writ.

Fix.of
Res.

Agric.

Urban.

Tech.
Spec.

Rule
present

119

2.61*

4.04*

3.65**

2.70

Absence
of rule

67

1.90

3.27

3.10

Rules
present:
Fixed sole 32
2.28
4.16
3.84
heir
Equal
86
2.72
3.99
3.57
shares
*
Difference significant at the 1% level.
**
Difference significant at the 5% level

Money

3.50*

Land
Trans
.
1.92**

2.39

2.37

2.84
2.65

37

Pol.
Int.

2.75*

Pop.
Dens
.
3.20

3.14*

Soc.
Strat
.
2.73*

Comp
Comp
Ind.
30.2*

Land
Market
Prob.
.2408*

1.55

2.09

2.25

2.63

1.96

23.5

.1290

3.88

1.75

2.64

3.25

3.21

2.88

30.7

.2107

3.38

2.00

2.79

3.17

3.12

2.67

30.0

.2354

*

Table 5: Logistic models
Model 1
Rule
present?

Model 1a
Rule
present?

Model II
Fixed Sole
Heir?

Model IIa
Fixed Sole
Heir?

Constant

-3.446*
(1.025)

-3.704*
(.931)

-1.907
(1.523)

-2.308*
(.763)

Writing and Records

.508**
(.231)

.538**
(.226)

-.379
(.255)

-.305**
(.159)

Fixity of Residence

.337***
(.219)

.377***
(.210)

-.070
(.302)

Agriculture

-.428***
(.225)

-.490*
(.213)

.142
(.298)

Urbanization

-.177
(.179)

Technological
Specialization

.789*
(.190)

.807*
(.187)

.407***
(.242)

Land Transport

.307
(.251)

.290
(.246)

-.273
(.283)

Money

0.27
(.175)

Population Density

.493*
(.203)

Political Integration

-.100
(.253)

.119
(.282)

Social Stratification

.122
(.205)

.216
(.224)

Dependent Variable

.148
(.243)

-.047
(.214)
.448*
(.182)

Dual Stratification?
Land Market Probability

-.159
(.263)

.
-4.449**
(2.289)

.482*
(.212)

-4.674*
(1.567)

N
186
186
Psuedo-R2
.322
.315
*
Coefficient estimate significant at the 1% level.
**
Coefficient estimate significant at the 5% level.
***
Coeffcient estimate significant at the 10% level.
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1.419*
(.487)

-.148
(2.057)
119
.132

119
.184

Predicted prob. of fixed rule, no
land market

1
0.9

Predicted
probability of
rule, including
probability of
land market
existence

Predicted Probability

0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
Predicted
probability of
land market

0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

10

Composite
ComplexityIndex
Index
Total Development

50

Figure 1: Predicted Probabilities of Land Markets and Fixed Inheritance Rules
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